This paper is based on Chapter 4 of my doctoral dissertation (Sandholm (1998) 
Introduction
Nash equilibrium is the cornerstone of non-cooperative game theory, providing a necessary condition for stable behavior among rational agents. Still, to justify the prediction of Nash equilibrium play, one must explain how players arrive at a Nash equilibrium; if equilibrium is not reached, the fact that it is self-sustaining becomes moot. This question has launched a search for procedures by which players can learn to play Nash equilibria, and for games in which such procedures are effective.
In this paper, we study potential games with continuous player sets, a class of games in which a wide range of evolutionary processes converge to Nash equilibria. These games are characterized by an externality symmetry condition which arises naturally in models of network congestion. We characterize the sets of equilibria which are locally stable under evolutionary dynamics, and establish the global convergence of solution trajectories to equilibrium states. We introduce a class of potential games in which evolution leads to efficient play. Finally, we characterize the games studied here as the limiting case of the finite player potential games of Monderer and Shapley (1996) .
We model behavior adjustment as an evolutionary process, assuming that players respond myopically to opportunities to improve their payoffs. This approach does not always justify equilibrium prediction. Even in simple normal form games, evolutionary dynamics can converge to closed orbits far from any Nash equilibrium; in some games, chaotic behavior is possible.
Rarely is global convergence to equilibrium assured. 1 This presents major difficulties for analyzing large population games: in general, we cannot guarantee that a population's behavior will ever even roughly approximate equilibrium play.
What prevents convergence? In evolutionary models, players switch to strategies which increase their payoffs. At first glance, constant adjustment toward better performing strategies might appear to drive the population towards an equilibrium state, where all payoff improvement opportunities are exhausted.
Unfortunately, this reasoning is flawed. At each population state, payoffs induce a set of "uphill" directions in which evolution might lead. However, as the state changes, so to do the payoffs accruing to each strategy, and consequently the uphill directions. A wide variety of dynamic behaviors are possible depending on how the 1 Numerous examples of limit cycles under the replicator dynamics and under the best response dynamics can be found in Weibull (1995) and Gaunersdorfer and Hofbauer (1995) , respectively. Cowan (1992) analyzes an example in which fictitious play of a 4 x 4 game leads to chaotic behavior. landscape adjusts. Indeed, cycling is a common result: in this case, the payoff landscapes behave like a staircase in an Escher print, forming a cycle of inclines which the population perpetually ascends. 2 Shifting landscapes are a consequence of externalities: when players switch strategies, they not only cause discrete jumps in their own payoffs, but also marginally shift the overall strategy distribution, altering the payoffs to all strategies.
It is therefore noteworthy that potential games are defined by a special externality structure. As an illustration, consider a traffic flow over a network of streets, and single out two complete routes (i.e., sets of successive streets), A and B. If a newcomer to the city chooses to commute via route A, the effect he has on a driver following route B only depends on the streets routes A and B have in common.
The marginal impact of this new commuter on the route B drivers is the sum of the marginal increases in delay on every common street. But a new route B driver has precisely the same set of streets in common with the route A drivers. Therefore, the marginal effect of a new route A driver on current route B drivers is precisely the same as the marginal effect of a new route B driver on current route A drivers. W e call this property externality symmetry, and any game whose strategies satisfy this property a potential game. 3 Externality symmetry places a critical restriction on the payoff landscapes a game can induce. While it certainly remains true that the uphill directions vary from state to state, under externality symmetry this variation must occur in a topographically consistent fashion. In particular, one can always find a potential function: a real-valued function defined on the state space whose uphill directions at each state represent the reasonable courses of evolution. Since strategy revision always drives the population uphill, closed orbits and chaotic behavior are impossible. Thus, the existence of a potential function provides a basis for justifying equilibrium prediction.
To open our analysis, we characterize the Nash equilibria of a potential game as the set of states satisfying the Kuhn-Tucker first order conditions for a maximizer of potential. Thus, maximizing potential is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for equilibrium. However, we shall see that only the maximizers of potential persist in the face of small disturbances of aggregate behavior and so constitute credible predictions of play.
2
The shifting landscapes metaphor was introduced by Binmore and Samuelson (1997) .
We characterize the states which are locally stable under dynamics satisfying a weak payoff monotonicity condition called net monotonicity. This condition, which requires that in an average sense, the growth rates of better performing strategies are higher than the growth rates of those which perform poorly, is weaker than nearly any other condition proposed in the evolutionary literature. 4 Nevertheless, we establish that in potential games, evolution under any net monotone dynamics can be described quite simply: the evolutionary process must always ascend the potential function. It follows that local maximizers of potential are dynamically stable: once the population is near a peak of the potential function, it must always remain nearby. Local maximization is also necessary for stability if the dynamics satisfy noncomplacency, a condition requiring that players eventually take advantage of opportunities to improve their payoffs.
While local stability results provide strong reasons to believe that an equilibrium that is reached will persist, they do not indicate whether one should expect equilibrium to be reached at all. To establish this requires a global convergence result which characterizes the ultimate behavior of the population for all possible initial states. Global convergence results can rarely be proved; nevertheless, only such results fully justify the prediction of equilibrium play.
We show that in any potential game, under any evolutionary dynamics satisfying net monotonicity and noncomplacency, all evolutionary solution paths converge to Nash equilibria. Regardless of the initial behavior of the population, the end result is equilibrium; closed orbits and chaotic behavior are both impossible.
Therefore, in any potential game, evolution completely justifies equilibrium prediction.
The properties which lead to convergence in potential games need not promote efficiency. When players choose strategies, they consider only their own payoffs, ignoring the externalities their actions impose on society as a whole. For example, roads that are relatively more sensitive to congestion tend to be overused i n equilibrium because each driver fails to account for the marginal increase i n congestion that he creates.
4
Net monotonicity is satisfied by both the replicator dynamics (Taylor and Jonker (1978) ) and t h e best response dynamics (Gilboa and Matsui (1991) , Matsui (1992) , Hofbauer (1995) ). Nachbar (1990) , Friedman (1991) , Samuelson and Zhang (1992) , Swinkels (1993) , and Ritzberger and Weibull (1995) study classes of dynamics whose members satisfy some basic evolutionary desiderata. Of these, t h e conditions considered by Friedman (1991) and Swinkels (1993) are both the weakest and the closest to the net monotonicity condition we consider here.
If players' payoffs to each strategy are directly proportional to the social impact of using that strategy, there is no conflict between individual and social incentives.
We show that this alignment of individual and social costs exists in any game whose potential function is homogenous. Congestion games have this property if the delays on each street are equally sensitive to the level of utilization.
Because it ensures that individuals and society as a whole agree on the relative values of the available actions, homogeneity has strong implications for aggregate efficiency. First, in any homogenous potential game, net monotone adjustment processes increase social welfare. Second, any state which is robust against small disturbances in aggregate behavior must yield locally optimal aggregate payoffs.
Third, if the potential function is also concave, as is the case when congestion lowers payoffs, equilibrium is unique, globally efficient, and globally stable.
When the homogeneity condition is not met, there is no guarantee of the efficiency of aggregate play. Nevertheless, by introducing an appropriate system of congestion tolls, a mechanism designer can force drivers to internalize the social costs of their actions, and thereby induce them to select routes in a socially optimal manner. Methods for constructing such tolls based on potential function techniques are the subject of a companion paper (Sandholm (1999) ). Rosenthal (1973) and Monderer and Shapley (1996) use potential functions to study finite player games. Rosenthal (1973) analyzes a discrete model of network congestion by constructing a potential function whose maximizers are the model's pure strategy Nash equilibria. Monderer and Shapley (1996) introduce finite player potential games. These games are defined by the property that the change in a player's payoffs from any unilateral deviation is exactly matched by a change i n potential. Nash equilibria correspond to local maximizers of potential, and since myopic better responses increase potential, evolution leads to equilibrium play. Monderer and Shapley (1996) also establish an equivalence between finite player potential games and the congestion games of Rosenthal (1973) . Our continuous population model possesses two distinct advantages over these discrete models. In settings in which congestion matters, and in situations in which evolutionary models are most appropriate, populations sizes are large; hence, continuous population models are more tractable than their discrete counterparts.
In addition, the continuum assumption allows us to use the tools of marginal analysis. This permits us to define potential games in terms of externality symmetry, a condition with a simple economic interpretation. More importantly, marginal analysis enables us to investigate the efficiency of aggregate behavior, which seems quite difficult to analyze in a discrete setting.
While the results on behavior adjustment obtained by Monderer and Shapley (1996) are similar in character to those obtained here, the formal connections between the finite and infinite player models are not obvious.
To draw comparisons, we restrict attention to finite player potential games in which players are anonymous and identical. We find a simple representation for these games i n terms of an extended potential function, and use this representation to define a notion of convergence for sequences of games whose populations grow without bound. We then prove that the limits of such sequences are the infinite player potential games studied here. The existence of this fundamental link between the two models renders the choice between them a matter of analytical convenience.
An early use of a continuous potential function can be found in a model of traffic flow due to Beckmann, McGuire, and Winsten (1956) . These authors use a potential function to characterize equilibrium and to establish conditions under which equilibrium is unique. We extend their work by both broadening the class of games to which potential function arguments can be applied and by establishing results o n evolutionary dynamics, social efficiency, and optimal tolling schemes.
Our conclusions concerning efficiency build on a result from biological evolutionary game theory known as the Fundamental Theorem of Natural Selection. This result, attributed to Fisher (1930) The interpretation of this result in evolutionary biology is discussed in Section 2.2.2. Friedman (1996, 1997) considers learning in a class of games with continuous player sets. Building on the earlier paper, Friedman (1997) studies non-atomic externality games. In these games, t h e aggregate play of each population generates a vector of externalities, with one component corresponding to each population. Each (non-identical) player's preferences depend only upon h i s strategy choice and the externality vector. Using submodularity arguments, Friedman (1997) establishes that convergence to equilibrium play is guaranteed under a number of discrete learning procedures, including adaptive and sophisticated learning (Milgrom and Roberts (1991) ) and correlated learning (Foster and Vohra (1997) ).
finite player potential games of Monderer and Shapley (1996) By allowing different population masses, we ensure that each infinitesimal player is of the same "size".
The set of strategy distributions within population p ∈ P is denoted
} is the set of overall strategy distributions. While behavior is always described by a point in S, it will be useful to define payoffs on the set However, when considering single population games, we omit superscripts and assume that the population mass equals one.
We call F a potential game if condition (P) holds:
for all x ∈ W , i ∈ S p , and p ∈ P.
Condition (P) says that there is a continuously differentiable function f whose gradient, ∇f , equals the payoff vector F. The function f, which is unique up to an additive constant, is called the potential function of the game.
The potential function encodes all of the information players need when deciding whether to switch strategies. Consider a state x ∈ S at which
At such a state, a player choosing strategy j would prefer to switch to strategy i. But since We do not require payoff functions to be differentiable, but if they are we can characterize potential games in a more intuitive fashion. In particular, if we modify condition (P) so that it requires a C 2 (twice continuously differentiable) potential function, then this condition is equivalent to externality symmetry (ES):
Externality symmetry requires that the marginal effect of adding a player choosing strategy i on the payoffs of players choosing strategy j is the same as the marginal effect of adding a player choosing strategy j on the payoffs of players choosing strategy i. This symmetry property has striking implications for the evolution of aggregate behavior.
Examples 2.2.1 Congestion Games
Congestion games are a simple and tractable framework for studying the utilization of resources arranged in a network. Flows of automobile traffic and electronic data are natural applications. Rosenthal (1973) introduces congestion games with a finite number of players and proves that they possess pure strategy Nash equilibria. However, many applications of congestion games involve very large numbers of players; in these cases, a continuous formulation is much easier to manage than a discrete one.
Consider a collection of towns connected by a network of streets. We associate each of p pairs of home and work locations with a group of commuters who must travel between them. Each player chooses a route (i.e., a subset of the streets) connecting home to work; his driving time depends upon the traffic on the streets he has chosen.
With this example in mind, we define continuous congestion games. A congestion model is a collection {P, m
}. P is a set of one or more populations, which in the commuting model correspond to the home and work location pairs. The mass of population p ∈ P is denoted m p , and m = m p p ∑ equals the total population mass. The finite set Φ contains the facilities which are the building blocks of the players' strategies. Each strategy i ∈ S p , p ∈ P entails the use of some subset of the facilities
denote the set of population p strategies which require facility φ.
, where each upper subscript refers to a population and each lower subscript to a strategy. The utilization of facility φ ∈ Φ is the total mass of the players whose strategies use that facility:
When a player selects a strategy, he bears the costs of each facility which the strategy requires. The facility costs, c φ : [0, m] → R, are continuous functions which report the penalties accruing to users of a facility as a function of its utilization. The congestion game derived from a congestion model is defined by its payoff functions:
Since payoffs to the strategies in a congestion game are sums of facility payoffs, the payoffs to any pair of strategies are bound together by the facilities used i n common. In the commuting model, the costs of any pair of routes both incorporate the delays on all streets which the routes share. Increasing the proportion of players from population p using route i affects the players taking route j ∈ S q through increased traffic on streets in Φ i p ∩ Φ j q . If facility costs are differentiable, the marginal effect of this increase can be expressed as
. An increase in the use of route j has an the same marginal effect on route i drivers. Hence, externality symmetry holds:
Facility costs need not be differentiable. Whether they are or not, we can verify directly that F is a potential game by observing that
. While our discussion of congestion has focused on settings in which congestion is bad, congestion is often a boon: externalities are often positive. For example, when consumers must choose among competing technologies, heavy utilization of a technology brings benefits to the consumers who choose it. Positive externalities can be captured in our model by assuming decreasing congestion costs. 7
Doubly Symmetric Games
Most work in evolutionary game theory has focused on single population linear games, in which F(x) = Ax for some n x n matrix A (i.e., F i (x) = (Ax) i for all i ∈ S).
The standard interpretation of these games is based on a random matching environment. Each entry A ij of the payoff matrix expresses the payoffs that a player selecting strategy i would receive in a random match with a player choosing strategy j. Thus, when the state is x, the expected return from a random match for a player choosing strategy i is (Ax) i . We can interpret these payoffs as the expected payoffs from a single random match, or the average realized payoffs accruing to players after a very large number of matches. In either case, it is the linearity of expectation which defines the payoffs' functional form.
If the payoff matrix A is symmetric (A = A T ), it defines a doubly symmetric game.
Under the random matching interpretation, the two players involved in any match receive the same payoff; one player's gain is by definition a gain for the opponent h e meets. This condition arises naturally in a basic model from population genetics. In 7 Monderer and Shapley (1996) establish an equivalence between congestion games and potential games with finite numbers of non-anonymous players. However, it is easy to generate examples which show that this result does not extend to the current context. Monderer and Shapley (1996) prove their result using a construction in which the number of facilities grows exponentially in the population size. When there are a continuum of players this construction cannot be used. this model, individual genes struggle to survive and reproduce, but because of sexual reproduction always compete as members of pairs.
The symmetry assumption captures the fact that the survival and reproduction of each gene in the pair depends on the fitness of the pair's host. 8 To see that doubly symmetric games are potential games, it is enough to check that externality symmetry holds:
. We can also observe that these games admit the potential function
More generally, one can show that any p player normal form game in which each pure strategy profile yields identical payoffs for all players defines a p population potential game. 
Two Strategy Games
f(x, y) = F 1 (z,1 − z)dz 0 x ∫ + F 2 (1 − z, z)dz 0 y ∫ .
Equilibrium
We begin our analysis of potential games by defining and characterizing their equilibria. Let the best response correspondence, BR: S → S, map each state x ∈ S to the set of states whose supports consist entirely of best responses to x. Letting C p ( x p ) = {i ∈ S p : x i > 0} denote the support of x p , we define BR p and BR by
A Nash equilibrium is a state whose support consists solely of best responses to itself: x ∈ BR(x).
We noted earlier that all profitable strategy revisions lead to increases i n potential. This suggests that the Nash equilibria of the game are related to the local maximizers of potential. The Kuhn-Tucker first-order necessary conditions for this maximization problem are
for all i ∈ S p and p ∈ P, and
where µ ∈ R r and λ ∈ R n . These conditions completely characterize the set of Nash equilibria.
Proposition 3.1:
The state x ∈ S is a Nash equilibrium of the potential game F if a n d only if (x, µ, λ) satisfies (KT1), (KT2), and (KT3) for some λ ∈ R n and µ ∈ R r .
Proof: If x is a Nash equilibrium of F, then since F(x) = ∇f (x), the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are satisfied by x, µ p = max j F j p (x), and
Conversely, if (x, µ, λ) satisfies the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, then for every p ∈ P, (KT1) and (KT2) imply that
and (KT3) imply that
, and so x is a Nash equilibrium of F. s
Observe that in equilibrium, the vector of Lagrange multipliers µ gives the equilibrium payoffs in each of the r populations.
Since S satisfies constraint qualification, satisfaction of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions is necessary but not sufficient for the local maximization of potential.
Thus, Proposition 3.1 suggests a division of the Nash equilibria into two classes: the stable equilibria, which are local maximizers of the potential function, and the unstable equilibria, which are not. This terminology is justified by Theorem 4.3, which establishes that the equilibria which are locally stable under evolutionary dynamics are precisely those which locally maximize potential.
There is one important class of potential games in which all equilibria maximize potential.
Corollary 3.2:
If the potential function f is concave on S, then all equilibria of t h e corresponding potential game F are in a single convex set.
Proof: Follows from Proposition 3.1.
To apply this result to congestion games, recall that these games admit the
. If facility costs are increasing (i.e., externalities are negative), this function is concave; 10 hence, equilibria are essentially unique. In contrast, if facility costs are decreasing, the potential function is convex, and there typically many equilibria, both pure and mixed.
Evolutionary Dynamics
In this section, we characterize evolution in potential games under net monotone dynamics. We show that the potential function serves as a Lyapunov function for all dynamics in this class; closed orbits and chaotic behavior are therefore impossible. Under the additional assumption of noncomplacency, we demonstrate the equivalence of locally stable states and local maximizers of potential, and establish the global convergence of solution trajectories to Nash equilibria.
Throughout this section we use terminology which is standard in dynamical systems and in evolutionary game theory. Formal definitions omitted from the text can be found in the Appendix.
Net Monotonicity and Noncomplacency
Many papers in the evolutionary literature study behavior adjustment under some fixed equation of motion, most often the replicator dynamics (Taylor and Jonker (1978) ) or the best response dynamics (Gilboa and Matsui (1991), Matsui (1992) , Hofbauer (1995) ). Rather than restrict attention to one particular specification of the dynamics, we instead propose weak conditions satisfied by most reasonable 10 We verify this in the Appendix (Proposition A.4). adjustment processes and establish results which hold for any dynamics within this broad class.
Evolutionary dynamics are described by a vector field V: S → R n which implicitly defines an equation of motion ẋ = V(x). We require V to satisfy Lipschitz continuity (LC) and forward invariance (FI):
Condition (LC) guarantees the existence of a unique solution trajectory from each initial condition in S, while condition (FI) implies that no solution trajectory leaves S.
Our main condition on the dynamics is called net monotonicity.
Geometrically, net monotonicity requires that except at rest points, the vector field defining the direction of evolution forms acute angles with the payoff vector field.
For a more intuitive interpretation of this condition, observe that by forward invariance,
asks that the growth rates of the better performing strategies tend to be higher than those of the worse performing strategies. This need only be true in an average sense: even best responses may become less prevalent if this decline is outweighed by the growth of other strategies receiving high payoffs. Moreover, there is only a single inequality restricting evolution in all r populations. Hence, the growth of poorly performing strategies in some populations can be compensated for by the growth of well performing strategies in others. The most closely related conditions in the evolutionary game theory literature are those of Friedman (1991) and Swinkels (1993) , who impose restrictions similar to net monotonicity on e a c h population. 11
11 Friedman (1991) considers weak compatibility, which combines net monotonicity within each population with extinction: x i p = 0 implies that V i p (x) = 0. Swinkels (1993) studies myopic adjustment dynamics, which satisfy net monotonicity within each population, but with a weak inequality replacing the strict one and with the additional requirement that all Nash equilibria are rest points (although this latter requirement is omitted in some of his results). For other conditions on Since F(x) = ∇f (x), F(x) is the direction of steepest ascent of the potential function.
Hence, net monotonicity requires that whenever the population is moving, it is moving uphill. This observation formalizes our earlier claim that any reasonable evolutionary process climbs the potential function. It also underlies our main technical lemma. We call a C 1 function f: S → R a global Lyapunov function for the dynamical system ẋ = V(x) if for every solution trajectory {x t } t≥0 , (i) d dt f (x t ) ≥ 0 for all t, and (ii) d dt f (x t ) = 0 implies that V(x t ) = 0. Condition (i) requires that the function f is weakly increasing along all solution trajectories, while condition (ii) demands that f is strictly increasing except at fixed points of V. Lemma 4.1 establishes that the potential function is a Lyapunov function under any net monotone dynamics, providing a powerful tool for characterizing evolution.
Lemma 4.1: If F is a potential game and V is net monotone, then the potential function of F is a global Lyapunov function for ẋ = V(x).
Proof: Net monotonicity implies that
Under the replicator dynamics, all faces and vertices of strategy space are forward invariant: once a strategy is extinct, it never resurfaces. We feel that this property of the replicator dynamics is not sensible in most economic applications. Knowledge of a profitable alternative should lead some players to switch strategies, even if the alternative is not being used. This motivates our final condition on the dynamics, which we call noncomplacency (NC).
(NC)
V(x) = v 0 implies that x is a Nash equilibrium of F.
If x is not a Nash equilibrium, there are players who would benefit from switching strategies. Noncomplacency requires that players eventually avail themselves of such opportunities. 12 evolutionary game dynamics which are stronger than net monotonicity, see Nachbar (1990) , Samuelson and Zhang (1992) , and Ritzberger and Weibull (1995) . See Weibull (1995) for a survey. 12 The replicator dynamics satisfy (LC), (FI), and (NM), but not (NC), while the best response dynamics satisfy (FI), (NM), and (NC), but not (LC). In the Appendix, we provide a simple generic construction of a law of motion satisfying all four conditions.
Evolutionary Stability
Our first stability result compares the rest points of the dynamics V to the Nash equilibria of the game F. At Nash equilibria, no infinitesimal group of agents can unilaterally improve their payoffs. It follows that motion away from a Nash equilibrium violates net monotonicity. All Nash equilibria are therefore rest points of the dynamics. Under the additional assumption of noncomplacency, only Nash equilibria can be rest points under V. 13
Proposition 4.2: If V is net monotone, then all Nash equilibria of F are rest points o f ẋ = V (x). If V is also noncomplacent, then the set of Nash equilibria of F and the set of rest points of ẋ = V(x) coincide.
Proof: Let x be a Nash equilibrium of F, and let V be some net monotone dynamics. Suppose D p (x) is the set of strategies in S p that are in decline at x:
Then forward invariance and the definition of equilibrium
. But forward invariance also implies that The predictions of a large population model should be robust to small fluctuations in the agents' aggregate behavior. Since we ought to expect aggregate play to exhibit small deviations from the equilibrium distribution, equilibria that are not robust against small disturbances do not constitute reasonable forecasts. It is therefore important to determine which equilibria are resistant to such fluctuations.
There are two main conditions used in evolutionary game theory to characterize the local stability of equilibria. Roughly speaking, an equilibrium is Lyapunov stable if no small perturbation can cause the population to leave the vicinity of the equilibrium, even temporarily. The stronger criterion of asymptotic stability requires that in addition, the population eventually returns to equilibrium. Since net monotone dynamics drive the population up the contours of the potential 13 The proof of this proposition does not depend on the existence of a potential function; the result is valid for any game with continuous player sets.
function, it seems plausible that connections exist between its local maximizers and the game's dynamically stable equilibria. These connections are established i n Theorem 4.3.
Before stating this result we require some additional definitions. A set A ⊂ S is a local maximizer set of f if (i) A is connected; (ii) f is constant on A; and (iii) there exists a neighborhood B of A such that f(y) < f(x) for all y ∈ B -A and x ∈ A. Since f is continuous, all local maximizer sets are closed. Moreover, Proposition 3.1 implies that all local maximizer sets consist entirely of Nash equilibria. We call a closed set isolated if there exists a neighborhood of the set containing no Nash equilibria outside the set. A set A ⊂ S is smoothly connected if for any points x and y in A there exists a continuous, piecewise differentiable curve γ contained in A whose endpoints are x and y. 14 Finally, the formal definitions of Lyapunov stability and asymptotic stability can be found in the Appendix.
We now state our local stability result.
Theorem 4.3: (i) Suppose that V is net monotone. Then any local maximizer set is Lyapunov stable.
(ii) Suppose that V is also noncomplacent. Then Proof: In the Appendix.
Part (i) of the theorem tells us that under net monotone dynamics, all local maximizers of potential are Lyapunov stable: small perturbations in behavior are not enough to move the population away from these sets. Without noncomplacency we cannot say more: since the population can become stuck at non-Nash states, local maximizer sets need not be asymptotically stable, and sets much larger than local maximizers can be locally stable. However, part (ii) of the theorem shows that if we assume both net monotonicity and noncomplacency, the local maximizer sets and the asymptotically stable sets coincide.
Local stability results are most important once a system reaches equilibrium, as they establish whether we should expect the equilibrium to persist. However, they 14 Smooth connectedness is a slightly stronger property than connectedness. For examples of sets which are connected but not smoothly connected, see Munkres (1975, p. 156-158) .
do not guarantee that equilibrium will ever be reached. In general, evolutionary game dynamics can exhibit closed orbits and chaotic behavior, with solution trajectories perpetually avoiding neighborhoods of rest points. When this occurs, equilibrium prediction is obviously inappropriate. Unless one can guarantee that such behavior is impossible, a characterization of local stability is of decidedly less interest.
Fortunately, we are able to establish that in potential games, under dynamics satisfying net monotonicity and noncomplacency, convergence to equilibrium is assured. Let the limit set of x 0 , ω(x 0 ), be the set of accumulation points of the solution trajectory with initial condition
Using this definition, we state our global convergence result. The first claim of Theorem 4.4 establishes that solution trajectories starting from each initial condition must converge to a connected set of Nash equilibria. In generic games, all connected sets of equilibria are singletons, so each trajectory converges to a unique limit point; in other cases, setwise convergence is possible.
The second claim shows that the sets of limit points, Nash equilibria, and rest points are identical. Together, these results fully justify Nash equilibrium prediction.
Ordinal Potential Games
Through this point we have assumed that all players from the same population have identical payoff functions. This assumption is strong: for example, in models of traffic flow it requires all players to experience the same level of disutility from delays. In many contexts it is more natural to only expect players' ordinal preferences to coincide: while we may not think that all players attach identical costs to delays, we generally believe that all have preferences which are monotone in the length of the delay. Fortunately, the analysis performed thus far does not depend crucially on cardinal properties of the payoff functions. We now show how our characterizations of equilibrium and evolution can be extended to games defined by ordinal preference relations. 15 An ordinal game with a continuum of players consists of a population mass, a strategy set, and a preference relation for each population. The preference relation for population p, f p , is a complete, transitive binary relation defined on pairs of elements of S × S p . We call an ordinal game f = ( f 1 , ... , f r ) an ordinal potential game if there exists a potential game F = ( F 1 , ... , F r ) whose payoff vectors for each population agree with the preference relations ( f 1 , ... , f r ) in the sense that
Since players only choose pure strategies, there is no difficulty in defining Nash equilibria for ordinal games. Indeed, the Nash equilibria of the ordinal potential game f are precisely the Nash equilibria of the associated potential game F. It follows that the equilibria of any ordinal potential game can be characterized by applying Proposition 3.1 to the associated potential game.
The main difficulty in applying our results on evolutionary dynamics to ordinal potential games is that the key condition on the dynamics, net monotonicity, is inherently cardinal, rendering it difficult to interpret when preferences are only defined ordinally. We can bypass this problem by imposing restrictions on the dynamics defined directly in terms of the ordinal preference relations. For example, we can consider dynamics satisfying monotonicity:
Monotonicity requires that if players in population p weakly prefer strategy i to strategy j, then strategy i has at least as fast a growth rate as strategy j. As this intuitively appealing requirement is stronger than net monotonicity, our characterization of evolution from the previous two subsections still applies.
Efficiency
Nash equilibria often fail to be social optima: because players do not consider how their actions affect opponents' payoffs, inefficiencies arise. In this section, we consider homogenous potential games. In these games, individual and social payoffs are perfectly aligned; consequently, myopic strategy adjustment leads to efficient play.
Homogenous Potential Games A potential game is h o m o g e n o u s of degree k if it admits a potential function
which is C 2 and homogenous of degree k + 1; we assume throughout that k ≠ -1.
Homogenous potential games have desirable efficiency properties, where efficiency is defined in terms of the aggregate payoff function,
Propositions 5.1 and 5.2 show why homogenous potential games have these efficiency properties and provide a simple characterization of homogeneity. 
Proposition 5.1 shows that in homogenous potential games, potential is proportional to aggregate payoffs. For intuition, consider the expression
which represents the impact of adding a player who chooses strategy i on aggregate payoffs. We can split this impact into two terms: the first, 
for all levels of utilization for which the facility costs are non-zero. A congestion game is isoelastic with elasticity η if η φ ≡ η for all φ ∈ Φ: that is, the costs of all facilities are equally sensitive at all levels of use. This condition is enough to guarantee homogeneity.
Proposition 5.3: Any isoelastic congestion game with elasticity η is a h o m o g e n o u s potential game of degree η.
Proof: Since the facility costs are isoelastic functions with elasticity η, they must take the form c φ (u) = α φ η u , where the α φ are constants. Therefore, since each u φ is linear in x, each payoff function F i p is a sum of functions which are homogenous of degree η in x, and so is itself homogenous of degree η . s -21-
Evolution and Efficiency
We saw in Section 4 that evolution always increases potential. But i n homogenous potential games, potential measures aggregate payoffs. Consequently, average payoffs must increase over all evolutionary paths. Because evolutionary paths ascend the potential function, dynamically stable equilibria coincide with the local maximizers of potential.
But since i n homogenous games the potential function represents average payoffs, the local maximizers are also the locally efficient states: that is, they are local maximizers of aggregate payoffs. Therefore, the locally efficient states and the dynamically stable equilibria coincide. 
Potential Games as Limits of Finite Player Games
In this final section, we establish connections between infinite population potential games and the finite player potential games (FPP games) of Monderer and Shapley (1996) . We prove that infinite population potential games are precisely the 
for all s α , ′ s α ∈ S α , s -α ∈ S -α , and α ∈ I. That is, any unilateral deviation has the same effect on both the deviator's payoffs and the potential function. The potential function serves as proxy for each player's payoff function when the strategies of his opponents are held fixed. It is easily verified that FPP games can be characterized as the class of games which admit the representation
where for each α ∈ I, a α is a function from opponents' strategy profiles S -α to the real line.
To make sense of the notion of a convergent sequence of FPP games, we restrict attention to games in which players are identical and anonymous. In particular, we assume that all players share the same strategy set S and payoff functions {u i } i∈S , and that the payoff and potential functions only condition on the population's aggregate behavior. We call FPP games which satisfy these requirements anonymous finite player potential games (AFP games).
Payoff functions of AFP games must take the form
where x denotes the current strategy distribution. The domains of the functions u i , P, and a are S N , S i N , and S d N , respectively, where
The set S N contains all possible strategy distributions when the population size is N, while S i N is the set of strategy distributions in which at least one player chooses strategy i. We call S d N the set of diminished strategy distributions; points in this set represent distributions of strategies in a subpopulation with one absent player.
The connection between AFP games and infinite player potential games becomes clearer if we represent the former in a slightly different way. We extend the domain of the potential function P from
We can then express payoffs as
In this representation, the extended potential function summarizes all information about payoffs. The payoff to a player choosing strategy i when the strategy distribution is x is the difference between the potential evaluated at two points: the current distribution x, and the diminished distribution x - This suggests that in the infinite population limit, the payoffs to strategy i should be related to the partial derivative of P with respect to i. The first step in formalizing this intuition is to define a notion of convergence. We say that a sequence of AFP
This notion of convergence requires only the convergence of the potential functions P N . Since the magnitudes of these functions are of the same order as the population size, it is the functions 1 N N P which must approach a limit; condition (C) requires that they converge at rate o( 1 N ). If the potential functions of a sequence of AFP games converges, their payoff functions also converge. More importantly, the collection {{u i } i∈S , P} defined by the various limits defines an infinite player potential game. This is the content of our convergence theorem. Hence, noncomplacency implies that V(x) ≠ 0 for all x ∈ B -A, and so net monotonicity implies that therefore, A is a minimal asymptotically stable set.
To prove part (ii)(b), suppose that A is a minimal asymptotically stable set which is smoothly connected. Let A ' be the set of points in A which are Nash equilibria.
Because A is asymptotically stable, there is a neighborhood B of A such that all trajectories starting in B converge to A. By Lemma A.1, the limit sets of these trajectories must be contained in A'. Therefore, A' is non-empty and asymptotically stable; it is closed by definition. But since A is a minimal asymptotically stable set, we conclude that A = A'. Thus, the set A consists entirely of Nash equilibria.
We continue with a lemma:
Lemma A.5: The potential function f is constant on any smoothly connected set o f Nash equilibria of F.
